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Responsibility shifting, a popular solution used in the event
of failure of primary authentication where a human helper
is involved in regaining access, is vulnerable to coercion at-
tacks. In this work, we report our user study which inves-
tigates the helper’s emotional status when being coerced to
assist in an attack. Results show that the coercion causes in-
voluntary skin conductance fluctuation on the helper, which
indicates that he/she is nervous and stressed. This response
can be used to strengthen the security of the authentication
system by providing coercion resistance.
Keywords




To meet the demand of scalability and usability, many
real-world authentication systems have adopted the idea of
responsibility shifting, explicitly or implicitly, where a user’s
responsibility of authentication is shifted to another entity,
usually in case of failure of the primary authentication method.
One example of explicit responsibility shifting is in the fourth-
factor authentication [1] whereby a user gets the crucial au-
thentication assistance from a helper1 who takes over the
responsibility. Facebook also uses a similar authentication
protocol which allows the user to recover his account’s pass-
word by collecting vouch codes from his trusted friends [2].
There is also implicit responsibility shifting which might not
seem as obvious. For instance, whenever suspicious activity
is detected in an user account, the system administrator
takes over the responsibility of revoking the attempted au-
thentication.
1The helper is said to be the fourth factor as someone the
user knows.
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Responsibility shifting does not enhance the security of
the authentication. Instead, it entangles with the authenti-
cation scenario and may weaken its security. A system that
relies on alternate email addresses for password recovery is
only as secure as whoever managing those alternate email
accounts. The provider of the alternate email account could
become the victim of an attack in an attempt to break the
authentication in the primary system. In the fourth-factor
authentication system [1], subverting the helper allows the
adversary to log in without capturing the password of the
user.
When the trustee to whom the responsibility has shifted is
another computer system, we can use any standard security
mechanism to protect it. However, when such a trustee is a
human being, protection becomes non-trivial because of the
potential coercion attacks. In a coercion attack, the adver-
sary uses physical force, e.g., wielding a gun, to coerce the
trustee to comply. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work to study the security of human trustees under co-
ercion attacks in a responsibility shifting in authentication.
(a) When forced to reveal his own password
(b) When forced to reveal someone else’s pass-
word
Figure 1: Coercion attack in different scenarios
The existing techniques against coercion attacks [3] rely
on the fact that the victim’s skin-conductance (an emotional
response parameter [7]) changes involuntarily upon coercion,
resulting in incorrect authentication credentials. We remark
that it is unclear whether the same techniques could help in
protecting the trustee in our study. The difference between
the trustee and a victim in general coercion attacks is subtle,
yet critical in terms of security, see Figure 1.
The victim shown in Figure 1(a) (and studied in [3]) is
coerced to reveal her own credential. The consequences in-
clude the victim’s account being broken into, and her valu-
able being stolen. It is therefore naturally believed (and
experimentally verified) that the victim becomes nervous
under such an attack. In contrast, Harry, the trustee con-
sidered in this paper (see Figure 1(b)), is coerced to provide
Alice’s credential, direct consequence of which does not in-
flict any harm on himself. No prior study has shown the
effect on emotional status of Harry in this case and his skin
conductance. Therefore, the crux of our work is to inves-
tigate whether the trustee’s skin conductance also changes
under coercion, and if any, whether the magnitude of change
is large enough to be captured by the coercion resistance
technique.
To put our study into a concrete example, we focus on the
fourth-factor authentication [1], a recent proposal on shift-
ing responsibility to help backup authentication. We first
provide an overview of the fourth-factor authentication pro-
tocol and discuss in detail the potential coercion attack on
it. As the main contribution in this paper, we then design
and conduct a user study involving 29 university students to
evaluate the trustee’s emotional status in a simulated coer-
cion attack. The results of our user study are positive in the
sense that the victim’s skin conductance still changes un-
der physical threats. The principles of our findings in this
study are applicable to other authentication mechanisms.
2. FOURTH-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
AND COERCION ATTACKS
As discussed in Section 1, fourth-factor authentication [1]
is a typical example of responsibility shifting. In this sec-
tion, we first provide an overview of the protocol used in the
fourth-factor authentication, and then discuss a potential
coercion attack when responsibility shifting takes place. Fi-
nally, we provide background on a recent technique [3] that
fights against coercion attacks.
2.1 Fourth-factor authentication protocol
In fourth-factor authentication, a trustee (Harry) to an ac-
count holder (Alice) is another registered user of the system
who can authenticate himself successfully and is usually a
person who knows Alice, e.g., a work colleague. He can ver-
ify Alice’s identity via any social means, e.g., by recognizing
Alice’s face or voice over the phone, when the responsibility
to authenticate Alice is shifted to him. Here we provide an
overview of the fourth-factor authentication system which
consists of the authentication server (AS), Alice (U) who
needs help in her authentication, and Harry (H) to whom
the responsibility to authenticate is shifted.
Enrollment: U provides AS with a list of members LU to
whom a responsibility to authenticate can be shifted in case
of emergency authentication.
Responsibility shifting: In case U loses her hardware to-
ken tk (but has password p), she shifts the responsibility to
H to authenticate herself. U first initiates the authentication
process by contacting AS and sending p to partially authen-
ticate with AS. U chooses a helper H from LU, and asks for
help to verify her identity to AS. H verifies the identity of
U (by recognizing her face or voice), and then authenticates
himself to AS and obtains a vouch code vc for U. H subse-
quently passes vc to U using the same means (over the phone
or face-to-face). Finally, U sends vc to AS, and AS verifies
vc and authenticates U.
This completes the fourth-factor authentication.
2.2 Potential coercion attacks
Note that the responsibility shifting extends the trust base
to authenticate Alice from one person (the owner of the ac-
count, i.e., Alice) to two persons (Alice and Harry). In Sec-
tion 2.1, Harry together with “half of Alice” (who only has
p and loses her hardware token) manage to authenticate Al-
ice to the system. The attacker who has stolen the other
half of Alice (the hardware token) could potentially use the
same protocol to impersonate Alice if he gets the help from
Harry (e.g., by coercing Harry). This responsibility shifting
enables the attacker to extend his coercion target from Al-
ice (who could be an important person heavily armed) to
any registered helper (who could be much easier to coerce).
Therefore, from Alice’s perspective, assigning a helper could
potentially make her account less secure. From Harry’s per-
spective, by agreeing to be the helper of Alice, he might run
into the risk of attracting coercion attacks on himself due to
the new capability he has on Alice’s account.
We reiterate that such a coercion attack exists in any re-
sponsibility shifting to authenticate in general, e.g., Face-
book trust based authentication [2], although in this paper
we use fourth-factor authentication as a concrete example
for better explanation.
2.3 Coercion resistance
Gupta et al. proposed a technique to fight against coercion
attacks using skin conductance in cryptographic key gener-
ation [3]. Here, we provide a brief overview of it since it is
used to process data captured in our user study.
During enrollment, features from the skin conductance
samples are extracted and modeled to feature descriptors,
the mean and standard deviation of which over a finite set
of training samples are calculated in order to tolerate small
deviation of a user’s skin conductance. A two column lookup
table is created where each entry of the lookup table either
contains a valid key share or some garbage value. Valid key
shares are extracted from the lookup table during authenti-
cation to reconstruct the key.
The idea is that if a feature descriptor bit is reliable, i.e.,
its mean µ and standard deviation σ always satisfy tSC ∈
[µ−k∗σ, µ+k∗σ] where k and tSC are parameters to acquire
a trade-off between the usability and security, then a valid
key share in placed in one of the columns and the other
column contains some garbage bits. If a feature descriptor
bit is unreliable, then both columns contain valid shares
(typically different). This ensures that “correct” descriptors
(when users are not coerced) lead to valid (non-unique) keys.
To be able to authenticate all the valid keys, a unique string
B is generated for each user, which is then encrypted with
all possible valid keys that can be derived from the lookup
table. Upon the end of the enrollment, the service provider
stores a template containing the lookup table and all the
encrypted values and B.
During authentication, a feature descriptor is generated
from the user’s fresh SC sample. This feature descriptor is
compared with tSC to generate a bit string called the feature
key. This feature key is then used to find corresponding
shares from the lookup table to recreate a cryptographic
key. The generated key is used to decrypt all the stored
values and if the decrypted value of B matches with B, then
the user is authenticated to the service provider.
3. USER STUDY
In a coercion attack, the adversary uses physical force,
e.g., wielding a gun, to force the victim to comply. When
the victim’s life is threatened, she would have no choice but
to follow what she is ordered to do. Therefore, a critical
element to fight against coercion attacks is victim’s invol-
untariness, i.e., defenses must disable the victim to perform
what the adversary orders her to do.
The first and only comprehensive proposal was due to
Gupta et al. [3] in using skin conductance to generate cryp-
tographic keys (see Section 2.3). However, as discussed in
Section 1, the scenario their technique applies to is substan-
tially different from responsibility shifting discussed in this
paper, where the coercion victim (Harry) is forced to re-
veal someone else’s credential (vc for Alice) instead of his
own. This raises an important question as whether the re-
quirement of victim’s involuntariness still holds here, i.e.,
whether Harry will be nervous or stressed (which leads to
involuntary change of his skin conductance and a different
cryptographic key) under such a coercion.
We answer this question by designing and conducting a
user study. Obviously, we cannot “really” coerce the par-
ticipants in our study, but have to mimic a scenario that is
close enough while passing our Institutional Review Board
(IRB)’s evaluation. In this section, we first discuss the diffi-
culties and complexity involved in designing this user study.
We then explain the participant demographics and the ex-
perimental procedure. Results of the user study are shown
in Section 4.
3.1 Difficulties and complexity
The challenge of this user study is to mimic the context of
responsibility shifting. For Harry to take over the responsi-
bility from Alice in an authentication, he needs to know her
well so that he is able to verify her identity by recognizing
her face or her voice. Therefore, one approach of the user
study would be to ask two participants (probably friends)
to come together. However, this poses a concern as we need
to coerce Harry to reveal some personal/privacy information
of Alice. Such coercion might lead to a negative impact on
the participants’ friendship, and is therefore not desirable
(would not pass IRB evaluation).
We propose another strategy whereby one participant plays
the role of Harry with two conductors (researchers) playing
the role of Alice and the adversary (M) respectively. Such
a setting eliminates the concern of breaking the friendship
of the participants, but would need to satisfy the following
criteria.
1. Harry (the participant) should hold some secret of Al-
ice (a researcher) whichM (another researcher) doesn’t
know (or Harry believes that M doesn’t know).
2. Harry should know this secret beforeM tries to coerce
him to reveal the secret.
3. Harry should believe that if this secret is leaked toM,
then there will be some severe consequences on Alice
or on Alice’s personal/private data.
Moreover, another difficulty to overcome is to find the
right balance between the research requirement of applying
sufficient pressure on the participant so as to mimic a coer-
cion attack, and the human rights requirement of no physical
or mental harm to the participants.
3.2 Participants and initial setup
Considering the stress on the participants, we decided to
concentrate on the younger generation (undergraduate and
graduate students in the age from 18 to 30). We have alto-
gether 30 participants, from which one participant was not
able to understand the story presented during the user study.
Therefore, we have only successfully performed our exper-
iments on 29 participants, out of which 14 were male and
15 were female. Participants were compensated with $20
(equivalent currency) for their participation in the study.
Since many previous works have shown that skin conduc-
tance is a reliable and convenient way of measuring one’s
emotional status [3], we used a skin conductance device (sim-
ilar to the one used in [3]) to monitor the skin conductance
response SC of the participant. Initially, there was an in-
complete disclosure regarding the purpose and the steps of
the study in order to ensure that the participants’ responses
are not affected by the knowledge of the research.
The user study was carried out in a relatively small room
with two laptop computers for Alice and Harry to use. Al-
though Harry was informed that both are Alice’s personal
and work computers (see Phase-I in Section 3.3), we de-
note these two computers as Alice’s computer and Harry’s
computer in the rest of this paper for the sake of clarity. Al-
ice’s computer was used to capture the skin conductance of
Harry, and Harry’s computer was the vehicle for the respon-
sibility shifting as well as coercion attacks (see the detailed
procedures below). We developed a small program running
on Alice’s smartphone which can lock Harry’s computer re-
motely. Alice carried the smartphone in her pocket and used
it to lock Harry’s computer without being noticed by Harry.
3.3 Experimental Procedure
The user study is divided in four phases.
3.3.1 Phase I. Passing the secret to Harry
Aim — This is to satisfy criteria 1 and 2 discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. A secret of Alice is passed to Harry while making
Harry believe that M knows nothing about the secret.
Procedure — At the start of the experiment, Harry is
greeted by Alice in the room. Alice informs Harry that
both computers are hers (personal and work use), and nicely
asks Harry not to delete or modify any existing data. After
Harry settles down in front of one computer, Alice remotely
locks it with her smartphone, and tells him to use password
“keepMeSecret” to unlock it. This password becomes the se-
cret Harry knows about Alice and M will later coerce him
to reveal it.
Note that the secret in our study is passed from Alice to
Harry directly. This is different from the real world respon-
sibility shifting where the secret is usually passed from an
authentication server or another entity. We remark that this
would not have changed the results of the user study, as long
as the third criterion stated in Section 3.1 is satisfied.
3.3.2 Phase II. Gathering normal skin conductance
data
Aim —We need to capture the skin conductance response
level when Harry is calm to set a baseline (normal emotional
state) before coercing him.
Procedure — We play a video by showing pleasant (ge-
ographical) pictures with soothing music when capturing
Harry’s skin conductance.
3.3.3 Phase III. Portraying M as a bad guy
Aim — Since we cannot really coerce Harry with, e.g., a
gun pointing to his head, we mimic the coercion in a way
that is acceptable to the IRB. The simulated coercion has
two steps. First, we make Harry believe that M is a bad
guy, and secondly, M will “coerce” Harry to do something
inappropriate (i.e., revealing Alice’s secret in Phase IV of
the user study).
To make the attack scenario appear real for Harry, we
also make an impression in front of Harry that M is aware
of the fact that Harry knows Alice’s secret (the password
that unlocks Harry’s computer in Phase I). This mimics the
context of coercion attack in responsibility shifting that M
knows that Harry has taken over the responsibility of Alice’s
account.
Procedure
1. M walks into the room and asks Alice (in a slightly
rude manner) to leave the room. Alice then walks out.
2. M walks to Harry’s laptop, opens the password man-
ager of the web browser and starts writing down the
passwords on a piece of paper. M makes sure that
Harry observes what he is doing on the laptop.
3. In a short while, Alice returns andM acts like he is in
the situation of embarrassment (idiom: “caught with
pants down”). M immediately closes the password
manager.
4. Alice presses the button on her smartphone to lock
Harry’s laptop (without being noticed by Harry), and
then asks Harry to enter the password to unlock it
(without speaking out the password). All these take
place when M is in the room.
5. M behaves rudely while talking to Alice and subse-
quently leaves the room.
6. Alice explains to Harry that M is her classmate, and
inquires what M has done during her absence. No
matter whether Harry mentions the details or not, Al-
ice badmouthsM, which further convinces Harry that
M is really a bad guy.
3.3.4 Phase IV. Coercing Harry
Aim — This is to capture Harry’s skin conductance re-
sponse when M coerces him to reveal Alice’s secret.
Procedure
1. M enters the room again and rudely demands that
Alice leave the room.
2. This time, Alice walks to Harry’s computer and man-
ually locks the screen before leaving the room.
3. After Alice leaves, M walks over to Harry’s computer
and starts guessing the password. After a few trials,
M verbally“coerces”Harry to reveal or enter the pass-
word. Sentences used by M include “I will complain
to my professor and he will take strict actions against
you”, “Don’t act smart, I know that you know the pass-
word”.
Toward the end of the user study, we explain to the par-
ticipants the real motivation of the study and provide a
questionnaire to find out their experience during the whole
study. Note that Harry’s skin conductance is continuously
measured throughout the study.
4. EVALUATION
We present the results of the user study and our interpre-
tation of the results in this section. As discussed in Section 1,
there is a subtle yet important difference between the co-
ercion received by someone in a non-responsibility-shifting
scenario [3] and Harry in our user study. The difference
is whether the victim is coerced to reveal her own secret
(or the secret that protects her own valuables) or someone
else’s secret. Therefore, we first analyze what participants
felt when they were being coerced to reveal Harry’s laptop’s
password. Building upon that, we then state our hypotheses
and based on approach proposed previously [3] we analyze
how many participants were actually nervous and stressed.
Here, we assume that Harry might be using such a system
to protect Alice’s secret he has, and evaluate the false-alarm
rate and miss rate of the system. After that, we analyze the
participants’ responses to the questionnaire to have a bet-
ter understanding of the collected skin conductance data.
The participants’ responses to the questionnaire are noted
on a 1–5 Likert scale: strongly agree ( ), somewhat agree
(G#), neutral (⊖), somewhat disagree (H#) and strongly dis-
agree (#). Finally we discuss the design and some of the
limitations of our user study.
4.1 Did Harry feel nervous and stressed?
We first review the participants’ questionnaire responses
to check whether they felt nervous and stressed during the
coercion. According to the results obtained for our 29 par-
ticipants, 86% of the participants felt nervous and stressed,
and the rest feeling neutral. This has two important impli-
cations. First, our user study design is largely a success, in
the sense that we have achieved the goal of mimicking coer-
cion on the participants. Second, it seems that most people
do feel nervous and stressed even when coerced to reveal
someone else’s secret, which is the main question our user
study seeks to answer. Four out of the 29 participants did
reveal the password of Harry’s computer, whose comments
include the following when inquired.
• “I was intimidated and gave in the password”;
• “I was not comfortable when the bad guy was forcing
me to enter the password”;
• “It was not my password and data”;
• “Alice can always change her passwords later on”.
Comments from those who did not reveal the password
include “it is not ethical to give away someone else’s secret
information to other”, “it is not a good idea to get involved in
someone else’s personal conflicts”, “I was not sure of the kind
of personal data residing in the researcher’s (Alice) laptop”.
4.2 Was Harry really nervous and stressed?
Skin conductance has been shown in many previous stud-
ies to be a reliable indication of one’s emotional status [8]. If
participants actually feel nervous in a responsibility-shifting
scenario, we envision that one could build a coercion-resistant
system using skin conductance. To better understand the
extent to which such a system could be successful, we eval-
uate its accuracy in detecting coercions.
We first state our two hypotheses that
• Hypothesis 1: The trustee whom the authentication
responsibility shifts to becomes nervous and stressed
upon a coercion attack;
• Hypothesis 2: What the participants have experi-
enced in the user study presented in Section 3 and
what the trustee would experience in a coercion attack
in the fourth-factor authentication follow the same dis-
tribution.
We simulate the execution of the system built upon a pre-
vious proposed coercion-resistant system [3] (see section 2.3)
and evaluate our two hypotheses stated with the skin con-
ductance data captured during our user study. We then
evaluate its accuracy in terms of false-alarm rates (a cor-
rect cryptographic key generated when Harry is coerced)
and miss rate (an incorrect key generated when Harry is
calm). We define a user as calm/nervous if the key gener-
ated during authentication does/does not match against the
key generated during enrollment.
The system is trained with 10 out of 26 SC samples (ran-
domly chosen with a duration of 10 seconds) captured during
Phase II (when Harry is calm, see Section 3.3), and is tested
with the remaining 16 SC samples in Phase II (to calculate
the miss rate) as well as all SC samples in Phase IV (to cal-
culate the false-alarm rate). Figure 2 shows the results with
three different settings of k (k is used to tolerate some er-
rors in the skin conductance response) and several different
























Figure 2: False-alarm and Miss rate
We observe relatively low false-alarm and miss rates of
our system built under our hypotheses. For example, when
k = 1.25 and tSC = 3.1, we obtained a false-alarm rate
of 3.1% and a miss rate of 1.7%, which are comparable to
those originally obtained in a non-responsibility-shifting sce-
nario [3] (false-alarm rate of 3.2% to 3.1% and miss rate of
2.2% to 1.7%). This, in general, shows that Harry was ner-
vous and stressed when coerced to reveal Alice’s secret, and
the combination of our two hypotheses are good explana-
tions to the data observed during the user study. We also
found from the skin conductance of those 4 participants who
revealed the password of Alice’s laptop during coercion were
all nervous and stressed.
A closer look at Figure 2 shows that the false-alarm rates
are higher than the miss rates. One possible explanation to
this is that some participants were not nervous for the whole
period of Phase IV of the user study. The “coercion” applied
to Harry in our user study is not as severe as a real-world
coercion attack, which leads to inaccuracy in our hypothesis
2 and an increase to the false-alarm rate.
4.3 Personal v/s someone else’s secret
In this subsection, we focus specifically on Hypothesis 1
to see how the difference between being coerced to reveal
one’s personal secret and being coerced to reveal someone
else’s secret could have affected its validity. Note that this
is also part of the main question we aim to answer.
We have presented to every participant the following two
statements and asked for their responses. Results are shown
in Table 1.
S-1. In the real world, you feel nervous when being coerced
to reveal someone else’s secret information (e.g., email
account password).
S-2. In the real world, you feel nervous when being coerced
to reveal your own secret information (e.g. email ac-
count password).
Revealing someone else’s secret




 6 12 2 0 0
G# 1 4 0 1 0
⊖ 0 1 1 0 0
H# 0 0 0 1 0
# 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Nervous when being coerced to reveal se-
cret information?
From Table 1, we notice that the number of participants
above the diagonal (highlighted) are higher (those feeling
more nervous when revealing their own secret) as compared
to that below the diagonal (those who feel more nervous
when revealing someone else’s secret). The result seems to
follow common sense, although this does not necessarily pre-
clude the possibility of designing a coercion-resistant system
for either case since the change of skin conductance may still
be large enough to be captured. To get an idea of this point,
we perform some simple analysis on the skin conductance
captured in this study and that captured in another one [3].
We found that in our user study the change in the SC data is
actually higher (µ=5.18, σ=2.58) as compared to (µ=1.86,
σ=1.28).
We warn readers from drawing more than what it deserves
from such a simple analysis. First, the two studies are quite
different, and a direct comparison of the skin conductance
captured does not have a strong basis. Second, although
changes in skin conductance have been shown to be a reli-
able indicator of emotional status [8], it has not been shown
that the value of skin conductance reflects the extent to
which the user feels nervous. That said, we believe that our
simple analysis could be viewed as an evidence that skin
conductance does change when they are coerced to perform
involuntarily, regardless the ownership of the secret.
4.4 Limitations of our user study
There are two main limitations of our user study. First,
Alice is played by a female member of our research team
in our user study. Since people in general show compassion
towards female gender, our results could be biased. Sec-
ondly, as the user study is an act, many unforeseen events
did take place. The actual scenarios were not always consis-
tent throughout the user study across different participants.
5. RELATED WORK
In this section we review some of the techniques which in-
volve implicit/explicit responsibility shifting and some pre-
vious work on emotion recognition. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first work on stress detection under
the context of responsibility shifting. As explained in Sec-
tion 1, an explicit responsibility shift occurs when a user fails
to reproduce her credential where an implicit shift occurs in
case when there is some suspicious activity in the account
etc. In both cases the entity to which the responsibility is
shifted can be either “human” or a “computer system”.
There have been many proposals on explicit shifting of re-
sponsibility when the user fails to generate her credentials.
Alternate email addresses can be used to reset the password
of the primary email-id in the case of password loss [10].
Other backup authentication mechanism includes personal
knowledge based questions [6, 5], preference based backup
authentication mechanism [4], and the fourth factor authen-
tication [1]. Facebook has added a security feature similar to
fourth-factor authentication where a user can recover his ac-
count by collecting the codes from 3 of his trusted friends [2].
Authentication schemes involving responsibility shifting are
always vulnerable to coercion attacks as long as the trustee
is a human being.
Recently Twitter (using implicit responsibility shifting)
automatically revoked access to those third party apps abus-
ing its APIs for users tweet collection [9]. This is also an ex-
ample of implicit responsibility shifting whereby the respon-
sibility is shifted to a computer system checking whether the
number of API calls are exceeding the limit or not.
Skin conductance is an emotional response parameter and
is associated with a wide variety of feelings, thoughts and be-
havior. Researchers have linked skin conductance response
to stress and autonomic nervous system arousal [8]. There
are many techniques proposed for emotion recognition, among
which Gupta et al. [3] proposed the first and comprehensive
approach to use skin conductance as an emotion recognition
parameter to fight against coercion attack, though it is not
for responsibility shifting.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we study the security of human-trustee based
authentication responsibility shifting, in particular, under
coercion attacks. Our intensive user study shows that most
trustees demonstrate nervousness when being forced to re-
veal others’ secret, which can be captured by their involun-
tary skin conductance changes. We envision that this change
could be used to develop coercion-resistant systems for re-
sponsibility shifting in authentication.
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